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Voting in the Aftermath of a Pension Reform:  
The Role of Financial Literacy 
1. Introduction 
Reforms involving important financial consequences for family budgets are often viewed as 
difficult to implement, because the burden that they impose on citizens can make a government 
unpopular, regardless of its goals. Jean-Claude Juncker, the current President of the European 
Commission, expressed this concern in a much-quoted aphorism: “We all know what to do, 
but we don’t know how to get re-elected once we have done it” (The Economist, 15 March 
2007). 
In this paper, we explore whether the electorate’s ability to understand essential 
economic concepts may be a relevant element for the evaluation of the “electoral costs” of 
economic reforms that typically require sacrifices today in expectation of benefits tomorrow 
and that have a relevant impact on individuals’ life cycle. Specifically, we focus on the major 
restructuring of pension systems that has taken place in advanced countries in the past decades. 
We study whether the probability of a government being confirmed in office is associated with 
the signing into law of a pension reform during its term of office and with indicators of the 
degree of basic economic and financial knowledge among the population. 
Research on the association between economic reforms and electoral outcomes in 
advanced countries does not decisively support the view that a “political toll” exists. For 
instance, Alesina et al. (2013) find no evidence of a clear relation between large fiscal 
adjustments and the probability of a government being re-elected in OECD countries. Buti et 
al. (2010), who analyse the impact of deregulation in five policy areas using the database on 
reforms developed by Duval (2008), show that the re-election of the incumbent government is 
not affected by reforms when a synthetic index of reformist attitudes in all policy areas is 
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adopted. The results are at best mixed when different types of reforms are considered: the 
association is mildly positive for tax wedge and unemployment benefit cuts and mildly negative 
for reforms of employment protection and retirement schemes. 
Related works study why it is difficult for a government to carry out economic reforms 
and analyse the conditions under which policy changes are most likely to occur. Alesina et al. 
(2006) use a “war of attrition” model whereby the political conflict between two generic groups 
in the society delays fiscal stabilization after a negative permanent shock to the economy. They 
show that reforms targeting the stabilization of large budgetary deficits or of the inflation rate 
are more likely to occur in times of economic crisis, after the appointment of a new government, 
and when the government is stronger. Dias da Silva et al. (2017) consider European Union 
member states and find that the probability of implementing structural reforms is higher during 
deep recessions and in periods of high unemployment, a result that is stronger for changes in 
employment protection legislation. Prati et al. (2013) show that there is a positive, albeit very 
heterogeneous across countries, association between reforms of real and financial markets and 
growth. Deregulation of real and financial markets is also positively associated with economic 
uncertainty, measured by stock market volatility, according to Bonfiglioli and Gancia (2016). 
In this work, we focus on the electoral cost of reforms that introduce structural 
modifications into people’s economic life cycle and are likely to receive prolonged front-page 
media attention, as is arguably the case for major changes to the pension system or to the labour 
market. We concentrate specifically on a set of policy changes that represent a key public policy 
issue in advanced countries, that is, on “major” reforms to the pension system. Accordingly, 
we collect information on those laws that are universalistic in their scope and that, according 
to international organizations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank (WB), are 
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targeted at improving financial sustainability by reducing future pension spending without 
putting the adequacy of retirement incomes at risk.  
The specific dimension of knowledge that financial literacy indicators capture can 
arguably relate to people’s understanding of reforms to the pension system. Pensions are a very 
important topic for everybody, but they are also rather difficult to understand, especially in 
public systems in which the correlation between the contributions paid in and the benefits 
received at the individual level can be rather loose. People may tend to interpret pensions as an 
individual right instead of the result of (compulsory) savings accumulated in the working 
period. Since reforms in general try to reinforce that relationship, a basic understanding of what 
a pension is and how a pension system works is needed. This understanding requires some 
basic economic and financial knowledge (like the notions of accumulation, compound interest, 
debt, and risk diversification) and may help government re-election. Pension reforms are 
widely discussed and sometimes very much resented and opposed. However, if the reform is 
needed, for example because the current system is no longer sustainable and fair, one should 
expect people who understand its basic principles to be less opposed to it. 
We find no robust evidence, as in Alesina et al. (2013), of a clear relationship between 
reforms and re-elections per se. The situation changes, however, when we take into account 
the level of basic economic and financial knowledge among the population. The electoral cost 
of a pension system reform appears to be significantly lower in countries where the level of 
economic and financial knowledge among the population is higher. We also consider other 
indicators of human capital and test their role as explanatory variables, finding no relation 
between these indicators and the electoral cost of major pension reforms. The results suggest 
that economic and financial knowledge has distinctive features that more general dimensions 
of education, such as school attainment, do not capture. 
4 
 
Our paper is part of the growing literature on the importance of economic and financial 
knowledge to people’s decision making. Recent studies by, for example, Lusardi and Mitchell 
(2007, 2014), Bucher-Koenen and Lusardi (2011), Fornero and Monticone (2011), and Van 
Rooij et al. (2011) show that economic and financial literacy helps to explain people’s ability 
to accumulate and manage wealth and build retirement plans. Poor financial literacy is also 
associated with a lack of portfolio diversification in both country studies (Guiso and Jappelli, 
2009) and cross-country research (Jappelli, 2000; Giofré, 2017). People’s ability to take 
advantage of new investment opportunities, measured by economic literacy, may help to reduce 
inequality across countries and over time (Lo Prete, 2013, 2018). Little has been undertaken so 
far to include economic and financial knowledge in models that study why governments are 
reluctant to introduce economic reforms. Experimental evidence on Portuguese voters suggests 
that people’s willingness to support pension reforms is related to the information that they 
gather (Fontoura Gouveia, 2017), while, in a recent work on data from the British Election 
Study, financial literacy seems to be associated with less favourable attitudes towards 
redistributive policies (Montagnoli et al., 2017). 
Of course, financial literacy is not the only ingredient necessary to implement economic 
reforms successfully. Nevertheless, it appears to be a relevant one in our empirical models, in 
which we control for macro-economic conditions, demographics factors, and the characteristics 
of the political system. Our findings contribute to the research on the association between 
reforms and re-election in advanced countries, with an innovative feature that emphasizes the 
role of economic and financial knowledge in the success of reforms. At the same time, this 
work adds a new element to the research on financial literacy, by focusing on its relevance to 
political choices, and offers a qualitative taxonomy of pension reforms for cross-country 
comparisons of major changes to the pension system.   
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define the variables that we use in 
the empirical analysis. In Section 3, we provide some descriptive evidence and present the 
empirical strategy. In Section 4, we reveal the empirical findings and test their robustness. 
Concluding remarks are provided in Section 5. 
2. Data and variables’ definition 
In this section, we define the variables that we use in the empirical analysis. Our data set covers 
the period 1990–2010. It includes information on pension reforms, the electoral outcomes of 
parliamentary elections, financial literacy, and other dimensions of education, as well as macro-
economic, demographic, and political conditions, for 21 OECD countries. The countries in the 
sample are Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  
Re-election. Following previous studies on the association between electoral outcomes 
and reforms (Brender and Drazen, 2008; Buti et al., 2010), we define “re-election” as a dummy 
variable to which we assign the value one if in year  an election takes place and the head of 
the government that held office before the election is confirmed in office and the value zero if 
a new head of the government is appointed. By considering who was in power before and after 
the election, our definition of re-election accounts for the possibility that a cabinet reshuffle 
that resulted in the appointment of a new head of the government belonging to the same party 
(e.g., the appointment of Major as UK Prime Minister after Thatcher’s resignation in 1990) or 
to a different party (e.g., the appointment of Bruton as Taoiseach of Ireland in 1994, after the 
formation of the “Rainbow Coalition”) occurred during the legislature. We do not distinguish 
whether such changes were due to the resignation, retirement, or death of the head of the 
government who held power at the beginning of the legislature that ends with the election in 
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year . What is relevant for our purposes is to rule out the possibility that the political toll of 
the reforms under analysis was paid before the elections by a different head of the government 
from the one who signed a reform into law. This is actually the case in our sample, in which 
cabinet reshuffles never occurred during a legislature that witnessed the ratification of a major 
pension reform. 
Pension reforms. We build our pension reform variable following an approach based 
on expected rather than effective results and consider whether a “fundamental” (structural) 
pension reform was introduced by the incumbent government. More specifically, we define as 
“major” a pension reform that satisfies both the following criteria: 
(a) introduces a structural change that – according to the evaluations of international 
institutions (such as the OECD, the WB, or the IMF) – has an impact in terms of 
financial sustainability and/or income adequacy; and 
(b) has a broad scope, that is, affects the generality of workers and not only specific 
categories, including reforms that aim to achieve greater integration of the public and 
private pillars of retirement systems. 
The resulting reform variable takes the value one if a major change in the pension 
system was signed into law during the legislature and zero otherwise. Table A.1 reports the 
number of legislative elections and the number of major pension reforms by country. The list 
of major pension reforms is presented in Table A.2 (details of the characteristics of the reform 
events that we consider and of their evaluation by international organizations are available in 
the Online Appendix to this paper).  
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Our definition has the advantage of ruling out minor changes to formulae and other 
technical features characterizing the pension rules (so-called “parametric” reforms1) that are 
not central to the pension system and that, as it is reasonable to expect, are less likely to receive 
widespread media coverage and voters’ attention. A similar attempt to distinguish between 
“marginal” and “structural” pension reforms is made by Fondazione Rodolfo De Benedetti and 
the IZA based on a scope criterion; specifically, they consider changes to the generosity of 
public pension systems that modified the monetary amount of pensions or the eligibility criteria 
for the generality of workers. We build on their effort by explicitly taking into account the 
sustainability and adequacy perspectives to evaluate the reforms under analysis and by 
enlarging both the country and the period sample.  
An alternative approach to the definition of the reform variable would be to consider 
effective results and measure the impact of pension restructuring on the household sector and 
on public finances. It is difficult to find statistics on changes such as the reduction in 
households’ pension wealth (i.e. implicit public debt, for a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system) or 
in the internal rate of return on contributions resulting from a reform and to arrive at clear-cut 
definitions. For instance, in Duval’s (2008) study on the role of macroeconomic policy in 
fostering structural reforms in labour and product markets, the author constructs an index of 
major reforms in old-age pension schemes by considering one of the few data series available 
for cross-country comparisons. He uses an average of OECD measures of implicit tax rates on 
continuing work and defines as “major” a change in the resulting indicator that was greater 
than two standard deviations of its annual change over all the observations considered in the 
                                                 
1
 Our taxonomy does not entirely correspond to the usual distinction between “structural” and 
“parametric” reforms, as some parametric reforms have a profound impact on 
sustainability/adequacy and may thus be considered as “major”.  
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study. This methodology allows a very limited number of reform events to be identified as 
“major” and, when used by Buti et al. (2010) to assess the association between reforms and re-
elections, constrains pension reforms to have an electoral cost only after they became effective 
– which could be many years after their implementation, depending on the length of the 
phasing-in period.2 Instead of relying on effective changes in money’s worth measures of 
pension programmes (such as replacement ratios, the internal rate of returns, and the net worth), 
we focus on people’s perceptions of the net costs (benefits) of a reform and investigate whether 
voting behaviour is directly affected by the enactment of a pension reform. 
Financial literacy. Financial literacy is generally referred to as the ability to understand 
basic economic concepts concerning individual financial decisions and the functioning of a 
modern economy (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014). To compare the level of financial literacy (FL) 
across countries, we use an indicator provided by the IMD Business School in Lausanne, 
published in the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook. The information on economic and 
financial knowledge that it gathers from the Executive Opinion Survey conducted by the IMD 
Business School is based on interviews conducted with senior representatives of the national 
business community who are asked to evaluate the level of economic and financial knowledge 
among the population on a scale from 1 to 10.  
Of course, indicators obtained from indirect surveys of interviewees may convey 
subjective biases. However, the IMD Business School’s indicator has the notable advantage of 
                                                 
2
 Duval (2008) classifies only eight changes as major reforms to retirement schemes in the 21 
OECD countries over the 1985–2003 period that he considers. The timing of such changes 
depends on the enforcement of specific measures that might have been phased in years after 
the reform package that they belong to was voted into law and placed before the people in 
polling stations. 
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being available for a large number of countries from the mid-1990s until the late 2000s. Recent 
macro-economic analyses on the relevance of FL to stock market participation (Jappelli, 2010) 
and inequality (Lo Prete, 2013, 2018) exploit its country and time coverage. A more recent 
direct indicator compiled through national surveys is the financial literacy score of the 
Programme on International Student Assessment (PISA) of the OECD. It assesses 15-year-old 
students’ experience with and knowledge about money. Unfortunately, data are available only 
for a few countries and for recent years that are outside our reference period. We consider the 
PISA score in FL as a robustness check anyway, to show that our results are robust to 
alternative measures of FL.     
Other indicators of education. Several dimensions of human capital accumulation may 
affect people’s understanding of public policies. To investigate whether FL has distinctive 
features with respect to other dimensions of education, we also consider OECD–PISA data on 
the level of “mathematical literacy”. They are based on the assessment of mathematical 
performance of 15-year-old scholars. The PISA score in mathematical performance aims to 
measure the level of skills that should enable people to make well-founded decisions on daily 
issues involving some mathematics, as could be the case for the evaluation of a pension reform. 
Although the surveyed students do not yet participate in parliamentary elections and may thus 
only marginally be interested in pension reforms, a caveat that also applies to the PISA score 
in FL, it could be argued that, where the PISA scores are higher, the financial literacy of parents 
is also higher. Finally, we consider more generic indicators of human capital – secondary and 
tertiary school attainment, as measured by Barro and Lee (2013) – to account for the percentage 
of people who have achieved a secondary or a tertiary school degree, respectively. 
Control variables. The probability of a government being re-elected may depend on 
several macro-economic, demographic, and political factors that are not directly related to the 
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reform process under analysis or to financial literacy. In the last part of this section, we list the 
set of control variables that we use.  
With regard to macro-economic conditions, we test whether people living in countries 
that experience periods of higher economic growth, expansionary fiscal policies, and lower 
inflation are keener to re-elect the incumbent government. To control for the spurious effects 
of the level of economic activity in the years before the elections, we include the output gap to 
GDP ratio and its change. To account for changes in fiscal policy and price-level dynamics, we 
control for the change in the primary cyclically adjusted balance and for yearly changes in 
inflation, respectively. As regards demographics, we control for the possibility that electoral 
outcomes differ across countries because of different age profiles of the population by 
including, as a proxy for the age of the median voter, the “median age” of the total population. 
As a robustness check, we also test whether the probability of a government being re-elected 
in the aftermath of a pension reform is higher in younger societies because young people may 
care more about long-term debt sustainability.3 
We include information on the main aspects of the political system and electoral rules 
using data drawn from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) by the World Bank (see Beck 
et al., 2001; Cruz et al., 2016). Like other studies on the determinants of re-election, we 
consider some characteristics of the political system, such as the presence of proportional 
versus majoritarian voting rules, parliamentary versus presidential systems of government, and 
                                                 
3
 The median age of the total population is an imperfect proxy for the age of the median voter. 
It is important to recall that youth abstention from the polls is a source of concern in modern 
democracies and that older people turn out to vote more than middle-aged and young voters 
(Glenn and Grimes, 1968, and related literature).  
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differences in the frequency of elections due to the constitutional term of office of the elected 
chambers.  
Next, we consider information on the incumbent government. To measure its power to 
implement policies, we use the “margin of majority” that it enjoys over the opposition parties, 
defined as the share of seats held by the parties supporting the government. The political 
orientation of the government may also be important in testing whether the electoral cost of a 
reform differs across parties due to their ideological connotation. For instance, one may expect 
a left-oriented government to lose more support if it becomes involved in reforms that impose 
a burden on all citizens irrespective of their income or wealth level. To represent political 
orientation, we define “left-oriented” as a government of which the head is from a Communist, 
Socialist, or Social–Democratic party. Finally, to account for the “stability” of the government, 
we consider the percentage of veto players (i.e. political forces who were formerly members of 
the government coalition) who left the government in the year before the elections.  
We also control for other macro-economic and political factors that might affect the re-
election probabilities in the aftermath of a pension reform. We consider whether the re-election 
probabilities are affected by the level of the real GDP and real GDP per capita, the 
unemployment rate, the level of government debt, and lags of some of the independent 
variables. As regards political conditioning factors, we investigate whether the electoral cost 
of a reform depends on political and civic support for the reform process.4 To include 
information on the political distance between the main parties elected at the national level, we 
                                                 
4
 As discussed in the literature on framing, not only the content but also the tone of public 
debates can matter to electoral outcomes (see, e.g., Chong and Druckman, 2007). Information 
on the nature, content, and intensity of policy-related discussions is difficult to gather. When 
data from qualitative analyses are missing, we consider other political conditioning factors. 
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use a measure of “polarization”. It takes the value zero if the party of the head of the 
government has an absolute majority and otherwise it measures the maximum distance in 
political orientation between the party of the head of the government and the largest opposition 
party. Then, we try to account for the possibility that people’s perception of a higher cost of 
ageing may create more sympathy for a reform and reduce its electoral costs. To this end, we 
include the difference between the 30-year projection of the old-age dependency ratio and its 
current level. We also control whether this effect is less relevant in countries where the pension 
system is more similar to a fully funded system (FF) than to a PAYG system by controlling for 
the type of the pension system. Pension systems in advanced economies are either strictly 
PAYG – with no reserves and often with deficits (i.e. the contributions are lower than the 
expenses) that need to be covered by general taxation or the issuance of new debt – or multi-
pillar systems consisting of a predominant PAYG system and typically private pension funds. 
None of the countries in our sample can be classified as FF. Nevertheless, we control for the 
fact that the Netherlands, Canada, the UK, and, to a lesser extent, France, are countries where 
pension funds are more important. 
Finally, we consider how early in the legislature the reform was introduced and whether 
a country has a greater tradition of re-electing the incumbent head of the government. As a 
proxy for the latter, we include among the regressors the maximum number of years for which 
a head of the government has been in office. According to the DPI data, this variable ranges 
from 5 years in countries like Japan and France to 16 years in Helmut Kohl’s Germany.  
3. Descriptive evidence and empirical strategy 
This section provides some background information on elections, reform events, and the FL 
indicator that we use. Then, it presents the empirical strategy that we follow.   
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In the sample of advanced countries that we consider, 118 parliamentary (general) 
elections took place between 1990 and 2010. The sample is unbalanced for several reasons. 
Election calls are of course not synchronized across countries. The constitutionally defined 
length of tenure is different and ranges between 4 and 5 years in our sample. Early dissolution 
of the legislature occurred 46 times and at least once in every country of the sample, with the 
exceptions of Finland, Hungary, and Norway. Focusing on electoral outcomes, the head of the 
government was elected for a second term of office in 49 election rounds out of 118. The head 
of the government was confirmed in office more frequently in Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, and Germany, where re-election occurred four times in the period under analysis. In 
contrast, in Italy, France, Hungary, and Poland, the head of the government was never re-
elected during the period under analysis. 
Between 1990 and 2010, 28 elections were held in the aftermath of major changes to 
the pension system. According to our taxonomy, we classify as “major” the pension reforms 
listed in Table A.2. It is possible that the same government implemented more than one pension 
reform act in the same legislature, like the Schussel Government in Austria, or that a change in 
the pension system was implemented by a series of legislative acts dealing with different 
aspects of the system, as was the case in Hungary in 1997, the Slovak Republic in 2003–2004, 
and Finland in 2005. We study the electoral costs of structural changes to the pension system 
that have a major impact on people’s life and on public finances. Fiscal consolidation measures 
receive more front media attention than policy innovations in other areas, especially at times 
when pension expenditures and demographic pressures challenge public debt sustainability. 
Acknowledging that perceptions and penalties may differ when a pension reform is part of a 
broader reform package, we assume that the electoral costs of a major pension reform are 
orthogonal to those of innovations in other policy areas, leaving to future research the task of 
studying policy complementarities theoretically and empirically. To relate electoral outcomes 
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to the introduction of major changes to the pension system, we consider whether at least one 
major pension reform was signed into law before the election day.  
We do not distinguish explicitly between contractionary and expansionary reforms, but 
the sample period that we consider (1990–2010) is largely the period of the pension reform 
process, with almost all countries being involved in pension restructuring with more rapid or 
lengthy phasing in. Reforms were generally introduced to improve the financial sustainability 
of pension schemes, threatened by population ageing, poor design, and “excessive” political 
generosity towards current generations. This does not prevent some aspects of the restructuring 
package carrying a positive sign for some specific groups of people. Nevertheless, looking at 
the overall framework, all the reforms in the sample were of the restrictive type – that is, they 
implied a retrenchment of past promises – and none of them has been reversed substantially. 
The pension formula was typically DB (defined benefits), but one of the features of the reform 
process of the last two decades has generally implied a move towards a stronger correlation, at 
the individual level and evaluated at the present actuarial level, between contributions paid and 
benefits received, that is, towards a less generous type of DC (defined contribution) formula. 
This is indeed, together with increases in the average retirement age, one of the two 
fundamental characteristics of the reform process. Some countries undertook this in a more 
direct way, by adopting the Notional Defined Contribution system (Sweden, Italy, and Poland); 
others, like France and Germany, attempted it more indirectly by recurring to a point system, 
with no automatic actuarial correction for the age of retirement.  
We also included in our list the privatization of the Dutch public pension fund ABP and 
the reform of the Finnish ITP occupational pension plan in 2007, to acknowledge the relevance 
of occupational plans in the countries considered – a choice that does not affect our findings, 
which are robust to the exclusion of these two reform events from the sample. Finally, as the 
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footnote to Table A.2 remarks, we record no major pension reforms over the period under 
analysis in three countries, namely Denmark, Greece, and Ireland. 
Figure 1 here 
To show some features of the variables under analysis, in Figure 1 we plot the frequency 
of pension reforms on the horizontal axis and the frequency of re-election on the vertical axis. 
In our sample, there is a slightly negative association between the percentage of elections that 
resulted in the re-election of the incumbent government and the percentage of elections that 
took place after a major change in the pension system. Interestingly, the countries that have 
reformed more are also those in which the governments have paid higher electoral costs, with 
the notable exception of Germany, where the reforms are associated with a high probability of 
the incumbent government being re-elected.5  
Figure 2 here 
Figure 3 here 
As regards financial literacy, Figure 2 shows the level of FL across countries using the 
financial literacy indicator from the IMD Competitiveness Yearbook. FL literacy is higher in 
Scandinavian countries, Ireland, Japan, and the Netherlands. In Southern and Eastern European 
countries, the level of FL is lower, in line with the evidence obtained from using another 
measure (i.e. the OECD–PISA score in FL for the few countries for which it is available). In 
Figure 3, we show that the level of FL has not changed much over time. FL, which is measured 
on a scale from 0 to 10, declined by only 0.18 points between 1995 and 2008 when we consider 
its sample average. Within countries, the differences between the initial and the final record of 
                                                 
5
 The results in Section 4 are robust to the exclusion of Germany from the sample. 
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FL literacy in absolute values are lower than 1 in all countries but Japan and the Slovak 
Republic.6  
3.1 Empirical specification 
We study the determinants of a parliamentary re-election () in country  at time  in 
empirical models that read as follows: 
                   = 	 +  +  ( ×  ) +   +  +  .         (1) 
We consider whether a major pension reform () was signed into law in year ′, 
where t − n ≤ t′ ≤ t and n represents the constitutionally specified term of office of the 
legislature.7 Then, we test whether the slope of the relationship between reforms and re-election 
differs across countries in ways that depend on the average level of financial knowledge among 
the population (). If FL helps to explain the association between re-election and pension 
reforms, we expect the coefficient of the interaction term, , to be significantly different from 
zero; otherwise, it is zero. 
The  set of control variables in model (1) includes macro-economic and demographic 
variables, country-specific characteristics of the political system, and indicators of the power, 
political orientation, and stability of the incumbent government. To account for the fact that 
                                                 
6
 The Slovak Republic is the only country in our sample for which FL was compiled by the 
IMD Competitiveness Yearbook starting in 2001 and not in 1995. We control for the potential 
role of outliers of both the Slovak Republic and Ireland, finding that dropping these two 
countries from the sample does not affect our results. 
7
 If the legislature is interrupted  years before its constitutionally defined conclusion, the 
inequality becomes t + s − n ≤ t′ ≤ t, as we consider reforms that occurred within the term of 
office of the elected chambers, regardless of its length. 
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people are more likely to consider recent events when casting a ballot in national elections, we 
average the macro-economic and demographic conditions over the current (election) year and 
the previous year (see also Fair, 1978; Brender and Drazen, 2008; Buti et al., 2010). To measure 
people’s understanding of the economic content of reforms that may have been signed into law 
up to four years before the call of the election scheduled at time t, and to reduce the potential 
measurement errors, we use the four-year moving average of the indicators of education (see 
the Data Appendix for details). In the next section, we will show that our results are robust to 
alternative timings of these independent variables. 
As discussed by Angrist and Pischke (2009) and in related literature, ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimators can be preferable to non-linear estimators when running regressions 
on panel data and when using instrumental variables. This is the case in our paper. In our 
empirical exercise, we use linear probability models and instrumental variables (IV) techniques 
to relax the assumption that reforms are exogenous to re-election probabilities. We also show 
that the main results from OLS estimators are similar to the results that we obtain from Probit 
estimators. 
4. Results 
We start by considering the bivariate association between the probability of a government being 
re-elected and the introduction of major changes to the pension system. The OLS estimates in 
the first column of Table 1 confirm, in the context of our study, the previous results obtained 
by Alesina et al. (2013). The probability of the incumbent government winning the elections 
is not significantly related to the introduction of a reform during its years of office.8 
                                                 
8
 The association between the pension reform variable and the probability of the head of the 
government being re-elected becomes mildly significant in specifications in which we include 
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Table 1 here 
In the second column of Table 1, we allow the relation between reforms and electoral 
outcomes to differ across countries that have different levels of FL among the population. The 
introduction of the interaction term between FL and the pension reform variable provides 
interesting insights. FL is significantly associated with the probability of confirming the head 
of the government for a second term of office not per se – its main effect not being estimated 
as significant – but because of its interaction with the pension reform variable. Like Buti et al. 
(2010), who consider a very narrow set of changes in the pension system, pension reforms are 
negatively associated with re-election probabilities, but, interestingly, in our data, this effect is 
mediated by people’s ability to understand basic economic and financial concepts.  
The positive sign of the coefficient of the interaction term between  and  
indicates that, in countries where the population is more financially literate, the electoral cost 
of a pension reform is lower. To provide an interpretation of the magnitude of the key 
coefficients, we need to consider the level of FL. The total effect of introducing a pension 
reform on the probability of the head of the government being re-elected is measured by β +
γFL#$ in equation 1. Based on the results from the linear probability model in column 2 of Table 
1, enacting a pension reform changes the probability of the head of the government being re-
elected by 15 percentage points for a country with an average FL (5.33 in our 118 country 
sample). Considering that FL ranges between 2.84 and 7.96 in our data, the results imply that 
the probability of re-election changes by -51 percentage points for a country with the lowest 
value of FL and by 100 percentage points for a country with the highest value of FL. This is an 
                                                 
the set of control variables listed in column 3 of Table 1. However, this finding is not robust to 
minor changes in the set of control variables or in the inclusion of country and time effects 
(results not reported). 
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important indication of the relevance of the association under analysis. Although the results 
from linear probability models should be interpreted with some caution, our estimates suggest 
that the electoral gains from investing in financial literacy are sizeable.  
In the following analyses, we test whether the results from the simple model in column 
2 hold when we account for other factors that may be relevant to re-election probabilities. In 
the next columns of Table 1, we include control variables for macro-economic conditions, 
demographics, and features specific to the political system and to the incumbent government. 
In the smaller sample, which the data availability allows us to inspect,9 our main findings hold. 
Re-election probabilities are negatively related to pension reforms, and FL plays a role in 
explaining this association. Re-election probabilities are also significantly associated with 
some control variables. The positive association with the level of the output gap indicates that 
the incumbent government has more chances of winning the elections in times when the 
economy is working above its potential, that is, in good times, in line with the results of Brender 
and Drazen (2008) and Buti et al. (2010). The probability of a government being re-elected is 
also higher for governments that have lost a lower number of veto players, that is, more stable 
governments, and for governments that have enjoyed a greater margin of majority (p-
value=0.104), as in Alesina et al. (2006). Re-elections are less likely in countries where the 
median age of the population is higher and in presidential systems. The results regarding the 
association between reforms, FL, and re-election also hold in specifications in which we 
include time effects (column 4), country effects (column 5), and country and time effects 
(column 6). Tests of the joint significance of the time and country effects indicate that only the 
set of time effects in column 4 is significantly different from zero. Finally, in the last column 
                                                 
9
 We lose observations because information on the output gap and the government balance is 
not available in the early 1990s for Germany, Eastern European countries, and Greece. 
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of Table 1, we compute Probit average marginal effects and show that our results from the 
linear probability models are also confirmed when using non-linear estimation methods. In the 
following analyses, we will test the robustness of the findings to endogeneity issues and 
perform other robustness checks, using linear probability models, including the set of control 
variables in column 3 of Table 1, and we will explore and discuss the role of time-specific 
exogenous effects.  
4.1 Endogeneity issues 
So far, we have made the implicit assumption that reforms are exogenous to re-election 
probabilities. As we discussed in Section 2, the pension reform process, over the two decades 
that we consider, was targeted to improve the sustainability of pension schemes. If changes that 
increase the generosity of the pension scheme are arguably motivated by electoral concerns, 
retrenchments are hardly driven by a desire to increase the popularity of the government within 
the electorate. Still, we cannot rule out the possibility that endogeneity issues will arise and 
bias our estimates.  
As our first exercise, we follow Buti et al. (2010) and run regressions on the sub-sample 
of countries that belong to the European Union (EU) and on the years that followed the signing 
of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. The argument for this estimation strategy is that those 
Maastricht criteria, and the limitations that they imposed on the discretionary national policies 
of the EU member countries, may help in considering the subsequent reforms as exogenously 
spurred by common developments rather than as the result of nationally driven interests. The 
results are presented in the first column of Table 2. The negative association between pension 
reforms and re-election probabilities and the positive sign of the interaction term between the 
pension reform variable and the FL indicator hold in the smaller 1992–2010 sample of EU 
member states. 
Table 2 here 
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Next, we use instrumental variables (IV) techniques. It is admittedly difficult to find 
good instruments for our pension reform variable. To isolate the exogenous (to re-election) 
component of major policy changes to the pension system, we include in the set of instruments 
country-specific indicators of the welfare state typology, their interactions with the exogenous 
forces driving pension systems’ reforms over time, the age of the pension system, and a variable 
that accounts for the introduction of supranational constraints on discretionary policies in EU 
member states.  
To provide more details about our instruments, the welfare state (WS) typology is a 
country-specific time-invariant characteristic that aims to capture different attitudes towards 
pension system reforms. We define it on the basis of historical roots and common traits of 
welfare states and identify five models of welfare: Social Democratic, Liberal–Anglo Saxon, 
Continental, Southern European, and Central and Eastern European (see Esping‐Andersen, 
1990; Ferrera, 1996; Bonoli, 1997; Katrougalos and Lazaridis, 2003; and the discussion in 
Gordon et al., 2006).10 To capture the exogenous forces driving pension systems’ restructuring 
over time, we first show the results from the specifications in which we use the ratio of the 
number of births to the total population, lagged by 30 years, as an indicator of demographic 
pressures.11 Then, we consider a more general measure of common time-varying forces: a set 
                                                 
10
 Although this taxonomy of welfare models has been somewhat bypassed by reforms that 
have increased the correlation between contributions and benefits at the personal level 
everywhere, it is still considered to be a valid representation of the diversity in particular of the 
European pension system. 
11
 The use of birth rates 30 years earlier as an instrument may be a problem if the age structure 
of the current population correlates with the voting preferences. According to the median voter 
theorem, preferences may change with age because of self-interest considerations. However, 
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of time effects. To measure the age of the pension system, we consider the date on which social 
legislation on old-age insurance was introduced for the first time. Finally, we use a Maastricht 
Treaty dummy variable that takes the value one if a country signed the Maastricht Treaty and 
zero otherwise. 
We instrument the pension reform variable, , which in the empirical model (1) is 
interacted with the level of financial literacy, , following Wooldridge (2010). We first 
estimate the predicted value of , which we name ℎ&, by running a regression that 
includes all the excluded instruments listed above and the set of control variables that will 
appear as included instruments in the second-stage regression. The predicted pension reform 
probability, ℎ&, and its interaction with FL, ℎ& ×  , are then used as 
instruments for  and its interaction with financial literacy,  ×  , respectively. We 
cannot test the exclusion restriction because the second stage of the two-stage least-square 
linear model (2SLS) is just identified.  
Our identification strategy is based on the assumption that the historical roots of welfare 
states and the common forces driving pension systems’ changes over time are not significant 
determinants of the probability of re-electing a government at time . We first present the 
results from the first-stage specification in which we consider an indicator of country-specific 
demographic pressures as a proxy for exogenous drivers of changes to the pension system. One 
advantage of using births rates 30 years ahead (BR) is the ability to report the results for 
                                                 
the impact of population aging on public expenditure remains an empirical question, because 
preferences depends on many other factors such as altruism, policy externalities, and voter 
turnout. Since empirical findings are mixed (for a literature review, see e.g. De Mello et al., 
2014), we cannot rule this possibility completely. Thus, we show that the results are robust 
when we exclude this instrument and use time effects in our preferred IV specification. 
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interactions between this time-varying variable and WS typologies easily in a table. The results 
are shown in column 2 of Table 2. They indicate that, with respect to the Social Democratic 
welfare state model, used as the reference group, the probability of implementing a pension 
reform is significantly lower in the Southern European welfare models and mildly lower in the 
Central and Eastern European models, and that these negative associations are less strong in 
countries with more positive demographic trends. The 2SLS results in column 3, in which BR 
is an excluded instrument, and in column 4, in which BR is an included instrument and appears 
among the explanatory variables for re-election probabilities in the 2SLS regression, confirm 
our main finding of a significant association between re-election probabilities and pension 
reforms and the role of FL in mediating it.  
The weak identification test at the bottom of the third column of Table 3 is a 
Kleibergen–Paap F statistic that generalizes the Cragg–Donald F statistic in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity (see Baum et al., 2007). Following the “rule of thumb” by Staiger and Stock 
(1997), it should exceed 10 to exclude weak instruments. This is not the case when we use BR 
as a proxy for exogenous drivers of pension systems’ reforms. Interestingly, this value is much 
higher than 10 in columns 5 and 6 that present estimates from the 2SLS regressions in which 
we interact the WS typology with the time effects. In column 5, the time effects serve as 
excluded instruments, while in column 6, they serve as included instruments. The empirical 
results from both the models confirm our finding that the electoral cost of a pension reform is 
positive across countries on average and that it decreases significantly in countries where the 
level of financial literacy is higher.  
4.2 Robustness checks 
In the following analyses, we test the robustness of our findings. As a baseline model, we 
consider the IV specification in column 6 of Table 2, which includes as explanatory variables 
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in the second-stage regression all the macro-economic, demographic, and political control 
variables listed in column 3 of Table 1 and the year fixed effects.12  
Table 3 here 
As we discussed in Section 2, the probability of a government being elected for a second 
term of office may depend on several factors other than the ones that we have considered so 
far. In Table 3, we run a set of robustness checks on macroeconomic conditions. In column 1, 
we include the level of real GDP and its interaction with the pension reform variable () 
to control for the possibility that richer countries are more willing to undertake reforms. In the 
data, this seems not to be the case in column 1 or in column 2, in which we control for the level 
of real GDP per capita and its interaction with .  
Next, we consider two indicators of other potentially relevant macroeconomic 
conditions. In column 3, we include the unemployment rate, which may be a relevant element 
to the median voter when casting a ballot at national elections. In column 4, we consider the 
current level of government debt to control whether voters are less likely to accept reforms that 
increase the government deficit at high levels of public debt, even when the reform is labelled 
as sustainable. We find that these variables are not significantly associated with re-election 
probabilities in our sample. Next, we check whether people with a longer time span left care 
more about long-term debt sustainability than older people, and thus whether the probability 
of a government being re-elected in the aftermath of a pension reform is higher in countries 
                                                 
12
 For each 2SLS model, we compute the predicted value of the pension reform variable from 
the corresponding first-stage regression (i.e. the one containing all the included instruments 
considered in our battery of robustness checks). We present the 2SLS estimates only for 
expositional convenience. Our findings hold when running OLS regressions (results available 
on request). 
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where the median age is lower, by including an interaction term between  and median 
age. The estimates in column 5 of Table 3 confirm that the re-election probabilities are lower 
in younger societies, but there is no evidence that the age structure of the population affects the 
electoral outcomes through pensions. 
Finally, in the last columns of Table 3, we explore whether people cast a ballot that is 
not only based on recent macroeconomic events, as we have assumed so far. In column 6, we 
include the lagged values of changes in the level of economic activity, fiscal policy, and price 
dynamics (which account for the average of changes recorded two and three years before the 
election year). In column 7, we consider changes over a four-year time span of the legislature, 
which varies across countries due to the constitutional term of office of the elected chambers 
and in the case of early dissolution of the government. The lack of significance of changes in 
macroeconomic conditions over longer time spans is consistent with the findings of Fair (1978) 
and subsequent studies indicating that what matters most to voters is recent events. 
Table 4 here 
In Table 4, we focus on political conditioning factors. We start by presenting the results 
from the models in which we interact some political variables with  to determine whether 
the electoral costs of a pension reform differ due to the power of the government (in column 
1), its political orientation (in column 2), or the level of political stability (in column 3). There 
is no evidence of such an indirect effect of political variables in our sample. We also test 
whether the re-election probabilities depend on the political support from other parties that the 
government may enjoy during the legislature. The results in column 4 of Table 4 indicate that 
the polarization variable, which measures the political distance between the leading party and 
the largest opposition party, is not associated with our dependent variable per se or when it is 
interacted with the pension reform variable. In column 5, we consider whether the old-age 
dependency ratios are expected to increase over a 30-year horizon, and we interact the 
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difference between their projections and their current level (which we refer to as “change 
ODR”) with the  variable to ascertain whether the perceived need to reform among the 
electorate matters to the electoral cost of a pension reform. We also control for the possibility 
that this effect is less relevant in countries where the pension system is more similar to an FF 
system than to a PAYG one. The FF variable takes the value one in Canada, the Netherlands, 
the UK, and France and zero elsewhere. The results indicate that the probability of a 
government being re-elected is lower in countries where the old-age dependency ratios are 
expected to increase more, that is, in faster-ageing societies. The interaction terms are instead 
not significant. In our data, there is no evidence that the electoral costs of a pension reform 
depend on the perceived need to reform or on the type of pension system. In column 6, we 
consider whether re-election probabilities depend on the maximum number of years for which 
a head of the government has been in office to test whether the re-election probabilities are 
higher in countries where there is a greater tradition of re-electing the incumbent head of the 
government. In the same column, we include a dummy variable that takes the value one if the 
government enacted the pension reform in the first two years of office to determine whether 
the electoral cost of a reform is lower in countries that enacted it early in the legislature. In the 
data, both these variables are not significantly associated with re-election probabilities. Finally, 
we use a different definition of re-election. In column 7 of Table 4, a government is re-elected 
if the party to which the incumbent head of the government belongs is still able to appoint her 
successor, independently of her identity. As the results show, our main findings also hold when 
we use this alternative dependent variable. 
4.3 Financial literacy and other education indicators 
The above analysis shows that FL helps to explain the association between electoral outcomes 
and pension reforms. In Table 5, we show that our results are robust to alternative functions of 
the FL variable, and we consider other dimensions of education. 
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Table 5 here 
So far, we have used the four-year moving average of the IMD World Competitiveness 
Yearbook’s indicator to measure the level of FL among the population. This timing allows us 
to reduce the measurement errors and consider the level of FL not only in the election year but 
also over the years during which the head of a government is likely to have ruled the country 
and enacted policies. In the first column of Table 5, we show that our findings are robust to the 
use of the average level of FL over the election year and the year preceding it. Our results also 
hold when we use the yearly value of FL, that is, when we consider its level in the election year 
(in column 2), and when we restrict the sample to consider the 1995–2008 period for which 
yearly values on FL are compiled and published in the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 
(in column 3). 
Another robustness check that may help to strengthen our conclusion that the empirical 
findings are driven by financial literacy is to show that the results do not rely on the specific 
FL indicator that we have used so far. Let us consider the OECD–PISA financial literacy score 
(OECD, 2017). This indicator, which assesses 15-year-old students’ experience with and 
knowledge about money, is available for a limited number of countries. The 2015 assessment 
covers 15 countries and economies, 7 of which are countries, or regions of a country, that 
belong to our sample, namely the Flemish Community of Belgium, 7 Canadian provinces, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Spain.13 If we use these observations to run 
                                                 
13
 Data on average financial literacy performance were also collected in 2012, when 18 
countries participated in an optional assessment by the PISA on financial literacy. However, 
the 2012 score is available only for four countries or regions of a country belonging to our 
sample (see Table IV.3.1 of the PISA 2015 Report). Given the limited value added of these 
data, we prefer to use the 2015 score only and exploit its cross-sectional information. 
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regressions on a 7-country sample, assuming that the OECD–PISA score in financial literacy 
does not change over time, we obtain the results reported in column 4. The sample is very 
small, and the results should be read only as preliminary and suggestive evidence of the 
goodness of the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook’s indicator that we have used so far in 
capturing the dimension of education that we call “financial literacy”. 
Finally, we consider people’s achievements in other dimensions of education. We use 
other indicators of human capital, such as the OECD–PISA score on mathematical 
performance, and attainment in secondary and tertiary schools. Table A.4 shows the 
correlations between the FL and these indicators of education. The bivariate correlations 
between the FL, the PISA score in mathematical performance, and the tertiary schooling are 
high. Countries with a higher percentage of highly educated people are countries where 
students perform better in mathematics and have higher levels of FL. Secondary schooling, 
instead, is less positively associated with the other indicators of education. In columns 5 to 7 
of Table 5, we report the estimates from the empirical models in which we use in the place of 
FL the indicators of education that we have just presented, one by one to avoid incurring 
multicollinearity issues. Interestingly, these measures are not significant determinants of the 
association between reforms and re-election probabilities.  
In our data, only financial literacy reduces the electoral cost of pension reforms. These 
findings support our view that the knowledge of basic economic and financial concepts has 
distinctive features that other dimensions of education do not capture. FL is a specific form of 
human capital that helps people to understand reforms that have relevant economic content and 
a significant impact on the life cycle of individuals. 
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5. Conclusion 
Our study of legislative elections held between 1990 and 2010 in advanced countries provides 
evidence in favour of a role of economic and financial knowledge in changing the probability 
of the head of the government being re-elected in the aftermath of a major pension reform. 
Where FL is higher, economic reforms that impose current sacrifices in exchange for future 
benefits seem to be understood better by citizens who are thus less likely to “punish” the 
governments that introduced them. The “electoral cost” of reforms is therefore lower. 
Our results for the specific case of pension reforms are robust with respect to the 
inclusion of indicators that account for the characteristics of the political system and for 
political, demographic, and macro-economic conditions. Interestingly, they do not hold when 
more general indicators of school attainment are used. Future research might successfully 
extend our analysis by collecting information on other reforms belonging to the same policy 
package or approved during the same legislature, such as policy innovations in the labour, real, 
and financial markets. It would also be interesting to use other indicators of economic and 
financial knowledge, like the PISA score of financial literacy and measures collected in 
national surveys that are made comparable across countries, as soon as more data become 
available. 
Our estimates suggest that the electoral gains from investing in financial literacy are 
sizeable. For a country with the average value of FL in our sample, enacting a pension reform 
changes the probability of the head of the government being re-elected by 15 percentage points. 
The costs of investing in financial literacy, on the other hand, are relatively small compared 
with other public policies. Financial literacy can be included in compulsory education 
curricula, and many countries are developing national strategies that include adult financial 
literacy programmes meant to increase financial inclusion and complement consumers’ 
protection (OECD, 2015). 
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Providing formal financial education in schools and to targeted adult audiences is 
becoming an important area of intervention, because the costs of financial illiteracy are high. 
Understanding basic economic and financial concepts is a key skill for individual consumers 
and investors who need to take proper decisions to manage their economic resources over their 
life cycle and who participate in fast-evolving financial markets. Our work suggests that 
financial illiteracy may also harm reformist efforts and has clear policy implications. As 
implied by Mr Juncker’s aphorism quoted in the introduction, the awareness of what is 
involved in a reform could be an important determinant of its electoral cost and future viability. 
Of course, FL is not a sufficient condition for the success of reforms per se. Illiteracy can, 
conversely, thwart their effectiveness by calling for an excessively long phase-in period or 
backwards changes to previously approved reforms. In this respect, FL could become a new, 
more transparent alternative to concealing the unpleasant consequences of reforms from 
citizens, a potentially key element in the relationship between citizens and politicians. Since 
such literacy is primarily a result of education, the government policy could thus indirectly 
induce long-run support for virtuous reforms and more effective citizenship by promoting 
specific education programmes for adults in parallel with basic financial education in schools. 
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Data Appendix 
The data set includes information for the 21 OECD countries listed in Table A.1. We collected 
data on parliamentary elections held between 1990 and 2010, ruling out presidential elections 
in countries where they take place, and on major pension reforms that were signed into law in 
the years before the parliamentary elections took place.  
Pension reforms. A list of reform events is available in Table A.2. Details of the pension 
reform variable are available in the Online Appendix to this paper.  
FL and other indicators of education. The indicator of financial literacy (FL) is the 
measure of “economic literacy among the population” compiled by the IMD Business School 
in Lausanne. Using data from international databases and from an international survey of expert 
managers, the IMD Business School publishes yearly indicators of the competitiveness of 
countries (i.e. their economic performance, government efficiency, business efficiency, and 
infrastructure) in its IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook. Data on FL are available for 55 
countries over the 1995–2008 period. The OECD–PISA score in FL measures the average 
financial literacy performance in 2015 (PISA, 2017). The OECD–PISA score in mathematics 
is the average value of the PISA scores in mathematical performance for boys and girls (we 
include the simple average over gender). They are available for 2003, 2006, 2009, and 2012 
(OECD, 2016). The measures of secondary and tertiary general school attainment are from the 
Barro–Lee Educational Attainment Dataset (version 2.0, June 2014 release; see Barro and Lee, 
2013). They are recorded every five years from 1950 to 2010. In the empirical models, we use 
the four-year moving average of the indicators of education. Missing data are interpolated when 
two consecutive observations are available. The FL indicator is filled onwards/backwards by 
keeping the first/last value constant in the years with no record. 
Control variables. The macro-economic variables are drawn from the Penn World 
Table (version 9.0), the OECD, and the IMF World Economic Outlook database. The data on 
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the median age of the total population (years) are drawn from the UN World Population 
Prospects (2015 revision). The data on the characteristics of the political system and on 
political conditions are from the Database of Political Institutions 2015 described by Cruz et 
al. (2016), which is an updated version of Beck et al.’s (2001) original database. The 
demographic projections refer to old-age dependency ratios (i.e. the ratio of people older than 
64 to the working-age population) from the online database Health Nutrition and Population 
Statistics: Population Estimates and Projections by the World Bank.  
Instrumental variables. We consider five welfare state (WS) typologies: Social 
Democratic, Liberal, Continental, Southern European, and Central and Eastern European. The 
age of the pension system is measured with respect to the year of introduction of the principal 
legislation on old-age insurance. We collect information on models and history of welfare 
states from several sources (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Ferrera, 1996; Bonoli, 1997; Katrougalos 
and Lazaridis, 2002; Gordon et al., 2006). The data on birth rates are from the World Bank 
online database and are expressed in terms of annual births per 1000 population. 
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Table A.1. Elections and pension reforms in 1990–2010, by country. 
Country No. of legislative elections in the sample 
No. of major pension 
reforms in the previous 
legislature 
Austria 7 1 
Belgium 6 1 
Canada 6 1 
Czech Republic 6 1 
Denmark 6 0 
Finland 5 2 
France 4 2 
Germany 6 3 
Greece 7 0 
Hungary 5 1 
Ireland 4 0 
Italy 6 3 
Japan 7 2 
Netherlands 6 2 
Norway 5 1 
Poland 5 1 
Portugal 6 2 
Slovak Republic 5 1 
Spain 5 1 
Sweden 6 2 
United Kingdom 5 1 
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Table A.2. 1990–2010 elections and major pension reforms, by country. 
Country Year of 
election Major pension reforms signed into law before the election day 
Austria 2006 Austrian Pension Reform (2003), Harmonization of Austrian Pension 
Systems Act (2004) 
Belgium 1999 Framework Act (1996) 
Canada 2000 Canada Pension Plan Reform (1998) 
Czech Republic 1996 Pension Reform (1995) 
Finland 1999 Pension Reform Law (HE 189/1996) 
Finland 2007 Pension Reform Laws on Earnings-Related Pensions (HE 118/2005) 
and on National Pensions (HE 119/2005)  
France 1993 Balladur Reform (1993) 
France 2007 Pension Reform Act (2003) 
Germany 1994 Pension Reform Act (1992) 
Germany 2002 Riester Reform (2001) 
Germany 2009 Retirement Age Adjustment Act (2007) 
Hungary 1998 Pension Reform Acts LXXX on Eligibilities and Finances of Social 
Insurance and Private Pension (1997), LXXXI on Social Security 
Pensions (1997), LXXXII on Private Pensions and Private Pension 
Funds (1997) 
Italy 1994 Amato Reform (1992) 
Italy 1996 Dini Reform (1995) 
Italy 2006 Maroni Reform (2004) 
Japan 2000 Pension System Reform (2000) 
Japan 2005 Pension System Reform (2004) 
Netherlands 1998 Privatization of the Public Pension Fund ABP (1996) 
Netherlands 2006 Life Course Savings Scheme (2006) 
Norway 2009 Flexible Retirement Act (2009) 
Poland 2001 Pension Reform (1999), Act No. 887 on the Social Insurance System 
(1998), Act No. 162 on Old-Age and Disability Pensions from the 
Social Insurance Fund (1998) 
Portugal 1995 Law 329/93 (1993) 
Portugal 2005 Law 60-B/2005 (2005) 
Slovak Republic 2006 Social Insurance Act (2003), Old-Age Pension Savings Act (2004), 
Supplementary Old-Age Pension Savings Act (2004) 
Spain 2000 Royal Decree 6/1997 (1997) 
Sweden 1998 Pension Reform (1998) 
Sweden 2010 Reform of the ITP Occupational Pension Plan (2007) 
United Kingdom 2010 Pensions Act (2007) 
 
Note: According to our coding, three countries recorded no major pension reforms over the period under 
analysis, namely: Denmark, Greece, and Ireland. A description of the characteristics of these reform 
events and comments by international organizations are available in the Online Appendix to this paper. 
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Table A.3. Summary statistics. 
Variable Obs. Mean Std Dev. Min. Max. 
Pension reform 118 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Re-election of the head of the 
government  
118 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Re-election, head gov. from same party 118 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Output gap 109 -0.01 2.91 -7.58 8.94 
Change in output gap 107 2.21 4.52 -5.34 35.84 
Change in gov. bal. 107 2.58 5.25 -7.27 47.73 
Change in inflation 115 3.80 5.07 -0.57 41.10 
Real GDP level 118 884 1083 64 4414 
Real GDP per capita level 118 29.29 10.63 8.38 76.02 
Unemployment rate 109 8.23 4.02 2.35 22.80 
Government debt 113 57.80 31.98 9.66 182.16 
Median age of the population 118 38.06 2.56 29.02 44.52 
Birth rate, lagged 30 years 118 16.54 3.01 9.90 24.60 
Change in old-age dependency ratios 118 17.33 6.14 3.37 31.14 
Age of the pension system 118 83.12 17.39 48 120 
Proportional 118 0.87 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Presidential 118 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Constitutional tenure 118 4.26 0.44 4.00 5.00 
Margin of majority 118 0.55 0.09 0.25 0.86 
Left-oriented 118 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Stability 118 0.05 0.14 0.00 0.75 
Polarization 114 1.19 0.93 0.00 2.00 
Maximin years of office 118 8.27 3.01 4.00 16.00 
Beginning of the legislature 118 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 
FL 118 5.33 1.26 2.84 7.96 
FL averaged over t and t-1 118 5.33 1.28 2.88 8.00 
FL yearly value 118 5.30 1.31 2.58 8.16 
OECD–PISA score in FL 39 497.21 32.28 445.00 541.00 
OECD–PISA score in mathematics 64 502.20 24.20 445.50 546.83 
Secondary schooling 118 54.41 12.91 21.23 88.00 
Tertiary schooling 118 17.50 6.86 4.87 41.22 
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis.  
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Table A.4. Correlations between FL and other education indicators. 
 
 
FL PISA score in 
maths 
Secondary 
schooling 
Tertiary 
schooling 
FL 1 
   
PISA score in maths 0.71*** 1 
  
Secondary schooling 0.04 0.06 1 
 
Tertiary schooling 0.65*** 0.53** -0.30 1 
Notes: (*), (**), and (***) denote significance at the (10), (5), and (1) per cent level. The data refer to 
pairwise correlations between the indicators using their 2008 value. 
  
41 
 
Figure 1. Pension reforms and re-election frequencies. 
 
Notes: The panel plots the number of re-election events against the number of major pension reform 
episodes in each country, both weighted by the number of election events over the 1990–2010 period. 
The correlation from an OLS regression, represented by the fit line, is negative (coefficient -0.39) and 
significant (t-statistic -2.89).  
 
  
42 
 
Figure 2. Level of financial literacy across countries in 2008. 
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Figure 3. Level of financial literacy in 1995 and in 2008, by country. 
 
44 
 
Table 1. Reforms, financial literacy, and re-election.  
Dependent variable:         Re-election of the head of the government 
Estimator: OLS OLS OLS OLS LSDV LSDV PROBIT 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
PREF  0.111 -1.266*** -1.173*** -1.279** -1.181** -1.404** -1.561*** 
 (0.108) (0.331) (0.421) (0.490) (0.446)  (0.628)  (0.5133) 
PREF*FL  0.265*** 0.252*** 0.290*** 0.258*** 0.326*** 0.313*** 
  (0.067) (0.080) (0.089) (0.078)  (0.101)  (0.099) 
FL  0.009 -0.008 -0.062 -0.063 -0.100 -0.002 
  (0.040) (0.049) (0.048) (0.116)  (0.121)  (0.039) 
Output gap   0.039** 0.035 0.028 0.034 0.037*** 
   (0.017) (0.026) (0.022)  (0.035)  (0.014) 
Change in output gap   -0.008 -0.002 -0.008 -0.003 -0.011 
   (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.014) 
Change in gov. bal.   0.007 0.005 0.010* 0.009 0.011 
   (0.006)  (0.008) (0.005)  (0.009)  (0.010) 
Change in inflation   -0.016 -0.034 -0.001 -0.039 -0.012 
   (0.023)  (0.022) (0.028)  (0.031)  (0.020) 
Median age   -0.048** -0.096*** -0.018 0.007 -0.047** 
   (0.023)  (0.031) (0.033)  (0.099)  (0.020) 
Proportional   -0.141 -0.206   -0.187 
   (0.173)  (0.200)   (0.149) 
Presidential   -0.265** -0.433***   -0.241** 
   (0.110) (0.131)   (0.098) 
Consitut. tenure   -0.246* -0.243   -0.269** 
   (0.134)  (0.158)   (0.122) 
Margin of majority   0.852 0.895 1.095 1.531* 0.750* 
   (0.519)  (0.563) (0.639)  (0.855)  (0.423) 
Left-oriented   0.010 0.065 0.012 0.008 0.015 
   (0.099)  (0.114) (0.077)  (0.110)  (0.083) 
Stability   -0.798*** -0.744*** -0.878*** -0.813** -1.165** 
   (0.296)  (0.369) (0.296)  (0.326)  (0.476) 
Country effects     X X  
Time effects    X  X  
Observations 118 118 107 107 107 107 107 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. (*), (**), and (***) denote significance at the (10), (5), 
and (1) per cent level. All the specifications include a constant, which is not reported. The OLS 
estimates are in columns 1, 2, 3, and 4. The LSDV estimates are in columns 5 and 6. The Probit average 
marginal effects are in column 7. 
Source: See the Data Appendix. 
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Table 2. Endogeneity of pension reforms. 
Dependent variable: Re-el PREF Re-el Re-el Re-el Re-el 
Estimator: OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
PREF  -0.989**  -3.042** -3.033** -0.965** -1.043** 
 (0.449)  (1.278) (1.267) (0.451) (0.462) 
PREF*FL 0.226***  0.593** 0.592** 0.213** 0.258*** 
 (0.084)  (0.256) (0.254) (0.090) (0.090) 
FL 0.065  -0.076 -0.078 -0.001 -0.057 
 (0.061)  (0.063) (0.072) (0.046) (0.039) 
Liberal WS  -1.352     
  (1.038)     
Continental WS  -0.973     
  (0.947)     
Southern European WS  -1.907*     
  (0.966)     
Central-Eastern European WS  -2.238     
  (1.380)     
Birth rate 30 years ahead (BR)  -0.070  -0.003   
  (0.060)  (0.031)   
BR*Liberal WS  0.086     
  (0.063)     
BR*Continental WS   0.071     
  (0.063)     
BR*Southern European WS  0.111*     
  (0.059)     
BR*Central-Eastern European WS  0.140     
  (0.085)     
Maastricht Treaty  0.087     
  (0.131)     
Age of the pension system  -0.003     
  (0.004)     
Time effects      X 
Kleibergen–Paap weak 
identification F statistic 
  7.36 7.77 24.29 25.52 
Observations 75 107 107 107 107 107 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. (*), (**), and (***) denote significance at the (10), (5), 
and (1) per cent level. All the specifications include controls for macroeconomic, demographic, and 
political conditions and a constant, not reported. The OLS estimates are in columns 1 and 2. The 2SLS 
estimates are in columns 3–6. The set of excluded instruments includes the age of the pension system, 
a Maastricht Treaty dummy, welfare state dummies, and their interactions with exogenous time-varying 
forces driving pension systems’ change (proxied by the birth rate 30 years ahead in columns 3 and 4 
and by time effects in columns 5 and 6). In the 2SLS regressions, the variable PREF and its interaction 
with FL are instrumented using the predicted value of PREF and its interaction with FL from the 
corresponding first-stage models. 
Source: See the Data Appendix. 
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Table 3. Robustness checks – macroeconomic conditioning factors. 
Dependent variable:         Re-election of the head of the government 
Estimator: 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
PREF   -1.059**  -1.086** -1.217*** -0.991**  -2.843* -1.293***  -1.055** 
 (0.448) (0.476) (0.452) (0.458) (1.535) (0.444) (0.450) 
PREF*FL 0.278*** 0.304** 0.272*** 0.240*** 0.223** 0.288*** 0.252*** 
 (0.083) (0.120) (0.083) (0.088) (0.093) (0.085) (0.089) 
FL -0.059 -0.073 -0.046 -0.057 -0.059 -0.024 -0.036 
 (0.040) (0.049) (0.050) (0.039) (0.039) (0.044) (0.039) 
Output gap 0.037* 0.036 0.029 0.035 0.039* 0.039* 0.033 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.025) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.021) 
Change in output gap -0.000 -0.001 -0.010 -0.001 -0.000 0.000  
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)  
Change in gov. bal. 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.012  
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)  
Change in inflation -0.046** -0.040** -0.030 -0.045** -0.042** -0.065  
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.051)  
Median age -0.077*** -0.103*** -0.094*** -0.097*** -0.108*** -0.110*** -0.097*** 
 (0.029) (0.026) (0.029) (0.023) (0.026) (0.029) (0.028) 
GDP level -0.000       
 (0.000)       
PREF*GDP level -0.000       
 (0.000)       
GDP pc level  0.003      
  (0.008)      
PREF*GDP pc level  -0.006      
  (0.012)      
Unemployment rate   -0.009     
   (0.015)     
Government debt    -0.000    
    (0.001)    
PREF*median age     0.051   
     (0.040)   
Change in output gap      -0.011  
    Lagged      (0.008)  
Change in gov. bal.      0.016  
    Lagged      (0.010)  
Change in inflation      0.039  
    Lagged      (0.043)  
Change in output gap       0.003 
    over 4 years       (0.003) 
Change in gov. bal.       -0.004 
    over 4 years       (0.003) 
Change in inflation       -0.005 
    over 4 years       (0.010) 
Observations 107 107 100 105 107 102 103 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. (*), (**), and (***) denote significance at the (10), (5), 
and (1) per cent level. All the specifications include controls for political conditions, time effects, and 
a constant, not reported. 2SLS estimates. As the baseline model, we consider the IV specification in 
column 6 of Table 2, which includes as explanatory variables in the second-stage regression all the 
macro-economic, demographic, and political control variables listed in column 3 of Table 1, as well as 
year fixed effects. 
Source: See the Data Appendix. 
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Table 4. Robustness checks – political conditioning factors. 
Dependent variable:       Re-election of the head of the government Re-elec.of the head 
of the gov. from 
the same party 
Estimator: 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
PREF  -1.346** -0.972** -1.000** -0.982** -1.345** -1.202*** -0.913** 
 (0.603) (0.468) (0.478) (0.418) (0.614) (0.393) (0.419) 
PREF*FL 0.257*** 0.256*** 0.244*** 0.227*** 0.274*** 0.266*** 0.230*** 
 (0.090) (0.090) (0.095) (0.088) (0.082) (0.078) (0.076) 
FL -0.059 -0.053 -0.048 -0.058 -0.078* -0.047 -0.022 
 (0.039) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041) 
Margin of majority 0.809* 0.857* 0.820* 0.767* 0.965** 0.780** 0.698 
 (0.477) (0.472) (0.476) (0.462) (0.479) (0.477) (0.477) 
Left-oriented 0.086 0.110 0.106 0.133 0.039 0.077 0.067 
 (0.097) (0.111) (0.102) (0.097) (0.101) (0.096) (0.090) 
Stability -0.778** -0.799*** -1.028*** -0.819** -0.727*** -0.723** -0.527* 
 (0.309) (0.308) (0.292) (0.325) (0.273) (0.319) (0.301) 
PREF*margin majority 0.572       
 (1.153)       
PREF*left-oriented  -0.128      
  (0.247)      
PREF*stability   0.975     
   (0.843)     
Polarization    0.009    
    (0.061)    
PREF*polarization    0.113    
    (0.122)    
Change ODR     -0.019**   
     (0.009)   
Change DR*FF     0.034   
     (0.025)   
FF (fully funded)     -0.622   
     (0.580)   
PREF*change ODR     0.011   
     (0.019)   
PREF*change ODR*FF     -0.011   
         (0.013)   
Max. years of office      0.013  
          (0.013)  
Beginning of legisl.      0.065  
          (0.166)  
Observations         107          107          107          104          107          107          107  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. (*), (**), and (***) denote significance at the (10), (5), 
and (1) per cent level. All the specifications include controls for macroeconomic and demographic 
conditions, time effects, and a constant, not reported. 2SLS estimates. As the baseline model, we 
consider the IV specification in column 6 of Table 2, which includes as explanatory variables in the 
second-stage regression all the macro-economic, demographic, and political control variables listed in 
column 3 of Table 1, as well as year fixed effects. 
Source: See the Data Appendix. 
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Table 5. Financial literacy and other indicators of education. 
Dependent variable:         Re-election of the head of the government 
Estimator: 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
PREF -1.140** -1.069*** -0.823* -9.783*** -1.816 0.613 0.411 
 (0.471) (0.414) (0.435) (1.723) (2.370) (1.217) (0.693) 
PREF*FL av. over t and t-1 0.277***       
 (0.092)       
FL averaged over t and t-1  -0.049       
 (0.038)       
PREF*FL yearly value  0.265*** 0.208**     
  (0.080) (0.089)     
FL yearly value  -0.058 -0.023     
  (0.038) (0.044)     
PREF*OECD FL in 2015    0.020***    
    (0.004)    
OECD FL in 2015    -0.026***    
    (0.004)    
PREF*PISA score in maths     0.004   
     (0.005)   
PISA score in maths     0.007*   
     (0.004)   
PREF*secondary school att.      -0.006  
      (0.021)  
Secondary school attainment      -0.003  
      (0.006)  
PREF*tertiary school att.       -0.005 
                (0.034) 
Tertiary school attainment       -0.003 
       (0.011) 
Observations 107 107 74 36 45 107 107 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. (*), (**), and (***) denote significance at the (10), (5), 
and (1) per cent level. All the specifications include controls for macroeconomic, demographic, and 
political conditions, time effects, and a constant, not reported. 2SLS estimates. As the baseline model, 
we consider the IV specification in column 6 of Table 2, which includes as explanatory variables in the 
second-stage regression all the macro-economic, demographic, and political control variables listed in 
column 3 of Table 1, as well as year fixed effects. 
Source: See the Data Appendix. 
 
 
